



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ciously. My reply would be that those of us who teach the history of philosophy have a still vaster field to deal with. If we can make ourselves fairly familiar with the main outlines of Aristotle's metaphysics and of his various individual sciences; if we can follow through the intricacies of Plato's thought, deal adequately with the Stoics, Plotinus, and the Schoolmen; and if we can then wrestle at all successfully with Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, to say nothing of more recent writers, we certainly ought to be able to follow any or all of the modern scientists, especially when their views are condensed severally, as in the Holt series, within the limits of 250 small duodecimo pages.

I might add, in closing, that I am planning a companion course for this one to be given next year. This aims to give a philosophic survey of what the human spirit has produced. It will deal with primitive life, both savage and barbarous, and with early and later civilizations. Modes of life, inventions, beliefs, forms of government and economic activities, art, literature, philosophy, and various contributions to modern life are some of the topics that will be treated as elaborately as time will permit. Much of our work in college is very fragmentary. Detailed studies of very limited fields are made and the student is expected to put together these *disjecta membra* into an illuminated and inspiring view of the world as a whole. The theory, within certain limits, is good, but there are not a few graduates who never "see the woods for the trees." The philosopher's function is largely to use the telescope, but not on a vacuum. In so far as he can make use, descriptively and appreciatively, of the results of the many sciences, both physical and social, and synthesize these into broad, helpful interpretations of the world as it is at the present day, will he more and more justify his position on a college faculty.

GREGORY D. WALCOTT.

HAMLIN UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Problems of Science and Philosophy: Volume II. of the Papers of the Aristotelian Society for 1919. Pp. 220.

To the man on the street the word science connotes a laboratory crowded with glass and with brass, monstrous implements for exact measurement, flasks and retorts and balances, graphs and outlines and all the other paraphernalia of the trade. And one suspects that the man in the seminar has not a very different conception of this term which is said to give its individuality to our century. Science and experimentalism; they are taken to mean very much the

same thing. Those who define the word in this way are wont to overlook the all-important contributions of the "theorists," the determining influence which some sudden *aperçu* has had in guiding the direction of research, and the mighty "abstractions" which have been the milestones of scientific progress. Problems which are not amenable to treatment in the laboratory they will scorn as unscientific if, indeed, they do not deny their reality altogether. Therefore they would be inclined to dismiss such a volume as this collection of papers read before joint sessions of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society and the Mind Association, with scant attention. Scientific *problems* they may concede certain of these questions to be (though few might admit the third symposium—Can Individual Minds be included in the Mind of God?—into this category) but that scientific *methods* had been employed or scientific *solutions* achieved they would assuredly deny. They might suggest a revised title for the volume—*Problems of Science Maltreated by Philosophy*.

But to those who are less given to dogmatism and who make clear thought and precise investigation the essential prerequisites of science, these discussions will seem worthy of this high title. That is to say, they fully justify the expectations which the previous publications of the Aristotelian Society have aroused.

The first paper in the volume, otherwise given to three symposia, is a contribution by Mr. Bertrand Russell on "Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean." One is aware in reading this paper of how far Mr. Russell has gone in the direction of a psychologized philosophy. Even those who might quarrel with this tendency will concede the acuteness of his critique of one aspect of Behaviorism. And as an Apologia for his drift towards "subjectivism" we are told that "the use of words actually pronounced or written is part of the physical world, but in so far as words obtain their meaning through images, it is impossible to deal adequately with words without introducing psychology and taking account of data obtained by introspection." One is tempted to wonder whether "words" are the only symbols which necessitate the introduction of psychology or whether the next volume of the *Principia* will be based on "data obtained by introspection."

With this irreverent, and, it may be, irrelevant, comment on Mr. Russell's essay we may pass on to mention the symposia which constitute the bulk of the proceedings. But we shall not so easily be avoiding Mr. Russell himself, for in the last symposium we meet him again, albeit this time in his more ancient and austere function of logician. He himself took no part in the discussion of the ques-

tion "Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance?" but his name figures constantly in the argument, whether in Dr. Moore's defense of Russellian doctrine or in the attack in which Dr. G. Dawes Hicks, Miss Beatrice Edgell and Mr. C. D. Broad are allied (or associated). Verily, it's Russell, Russell all the way.

The second symposium, to which the majority of the speakers gave their attention, concerned "Time, Space and Material: Are They, and if so in what Sense, the Ultimate Data of Science?" One can easily see why six speakers should be required to present the various viewpoints implicit in this ancient dispute. But the terms of the argument in this instance are by no means ancient. The disputants may in general be divided into two groups; the defendants of the "older physics" of the other are ranged against the partisans of the new quantum physicists, with Einstein and Relativity as a sort of bugaboo in the background of the discussion. Thus Professor Whitehead presents an account in which "the material ether has disappeared. It is replaced by an ether of events, which is formed of events whose character is expressed by the properties of the electro-magnetic field" and which may surely be said to be no ether at all. Sir Oliver Lodge, on the other hand, insists that "unless the ether is taken into account the scheme of physics is unintelligible," but traces our original apprehension of the data of science to our experience of motion and force in the sense of effort. This observation is concurred in by Mr. J. W. Nicholson when he says that "the actual quantum itself is one of *action*," but in general he is in agreement with Dr. Whitehead. The remaining three contributions to this symposium approach their problems from decidedly different standpoints. Dr. H. Wildon Carr pursues the historical mode of attack, Mr. Henry Head views the question from the standpoint of the physiologist, assuming that "the fabric of philosophy depends on the nature of physiological reactions produced by the impact of physical stimuli on sense organs," while Mrs. Adrian Stephen (Karin Costelloe) treats the problem as a Bergsonian.

An equally various approach to the problem characterizes the contributors to the remaining symposium: "Can individual Minds be included in the Mind of God?" In this discussion the protagonists are really Messrs. Pringle-Pattison and Bradley, neither of whom appears to have been present, for whereas not all of the disputants appear as partisans of one or the other, all find occasion to describe their solutions by explicit reference to these writers. Dean Hastings Rashdall champions the primacy of personality and concludes that "the Absolute—if you must indulge in that 'blessed word'—includes other minds; God, if He is a Mind, does not."

Bishop D'Arcy finds himself in such "complete agreement with Dean Rashdall" that he takes the opposite position, that of Mr. Bradley, though he presents a more "democratic conception of the Absolute." Professor Muirhead advocates a theory of organic relationships and holds that "self-transcendence so far from meaning a sacrifice of individuality is the only way to realize it." Dr. Schiller sees empirical evidence for the possibility of one mind including others in experiments in psychical research, but finds this conclusion objectionable not on intellectual but on moral grounds. And with characteristic and wholesome didacticism he insists that "if a tithe of the ingenuity which has been bestowed upon the deifying of the Whole had been devoted to exploring the possibilities of a divine intelligence more in accord with human nature, philosophic inquiry might have attained results far more considerable and satisfactory."

JAMES GUTMANN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

An Outline of Abnormal Psychology: JAMES W. BRIDGES. Columbus, Ohio: R. G. Adams & Company, 1919, Pp. 126.

The omission of illustrations and typical cases makes the *Outline* rather dry reading. In fact, no one but a reviewer would ever attempt a consecutive perusal of its pages. Its undoubted usefulness to the beginner, or for directing the increasing number of general students of psychological topics, makes us wish for a brief evaluation of the semi-popular and popular literature that too often constitute the entire sources of information for the majority of readers. The outline and definition form of the text does not lend itself readily to the genetic viewpoint so generally stressed today in the literature. Dr. Bridges's acceptance of the "neurological explanation" as the final one (p. 12), in the present state of such "explanations," naturally conforms best to the disjointed nature of outlines. Though the social worker *et al.* may gain facility in the use of terms, understanding the case and skill in handling it can not arise from "surveys" of this type.

The book is a more comprehensive attempt to introduce orderly arrangement among the data of abnormal psychology than has hitherto been attempted. Such recent efforts at classification as those made by the late Dr. E. E. Southard and Dr. Adolph Meyer indicate that abnormal psychology and psychiatry are feeling the need of better or more thoroughgoing classification of the topics in their fields. We commend the book to those who are giving courses in this field. Other outlines should be published.

A new edition should eliminate a few proofreader's errors.